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The Centre has increased the deployment of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) from 581 companies in 2025 to 670 companies for the 57-day Amarnath Yatra in 2026, adding 89 companies. This decision follows the April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack on tourists, which heightened security concerns. For the first time after the attack, the Jammu and Kashmir Police conducted background checks on service providers (e.g., palanquin and horse ride operators) and issued them special identity cards with QR codes. Advanced security measures include anti-sabotage teams, face detectors, and real-time monitoring systems. The J&K DGP Nalin Prabhat directed district heads to ensure proper deployment and proactive strategies against threats.
The Amarnath Yatra is an annual Hindu pilgrimage to the cave shrine in Jammu and Kashmir, typically lasting 40-60 days. Security has been a persistent challenge due to militant activity in the region. The Shri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB) manages the yatra. Notable security incidents include the 2017 bus attack that killed 7 pilgrims and minor incidents in 2018 and 2021. The 2025 Pahalgam attack targeted tourists, prompting a comprehensive security review. Historically, CAPF deployment has increased over the years. In 2025, 581 CAPF companies were deployed; the 2026 figure of 670 is the highest ever. The yatra uses two main routes: Pahalgam in south Kashmir and Baltal in central Kashmir, with the entry point at Lakhanpur in Jammu. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are periodically refined based on threat assessments. The J&K Police and CAPF collaborate, with the Home Ministry overseeing overall security.
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Political & Constitutional Dimensions: The increased CAPF deployment reflects the Centre's responsibility under Article 355 to protect states from internal disturbance. Article 256 mandates state compliance with Union laws, but the move is executive-driven. The opposition may criticize the securitization of the yatra, arguing it signals a failure of intelligence and governance. However, the government justifies it as a necessary response to the 2025 Pahalgam attack. The J&K administration's cooperation indicates Centre-state coordination. The Home Ministry's role in authorizing additional forces is crucial.
Economic & Financial Impact: The deployment of 89 additional CAPF companies incurs significant costs (salaries, logistics, rations) borne by the Centre. The yatra is economically vital for local service providers (palanquin, horse, tent, and food vendors); security measures may increase compliance costs but ensure continuity. Tourism revenue could decline if pilgrims are deterred by heavy security, but improved safety may boost confidence. The financial burden on the exchequer must be weighed against the benefits of social stability.
Social Dimensions: The security measures disproportionately affect pilgrims (largely Hindu) and local communities in the Kashmir Valley. Background checks and QR IDs may streamline services but could be seen as intrusive. The measures aim to prevent infiltration by terrorists, but they also impact the livelihoods of service providers. In a Muslim-majority region, such security presences can be perceived as over-policing, potentially fuelling alienation. However, ensuring the safety of pilgrims is a basic welfare obligation. The J&K Police's community policing efforts are critical.
Governance & Administrative Aspects: Implementation involves coordinating multiple agencies: CAPF, J&K Police, Army, and civilian administration. The SOP revision and DGP's directives reflect proactive governance. However, challenges include maintaining troop morale during a long yatra, ensuring effective real-time monitoring, and avoiding bottlenecks at checkpoints. The QR code system for service providers is a technological solution but requires robust backend data management. Learning from past yatras, the focus on intelligence-based operations and area domination is commendable. Nodal officers and control rooms are typically set up.
International Perspective: India's internal security, especially in J&K, is observed by the global community. Successful security during such a high-profile yatra boosts India's image as a stable democracy capable of managing internal threats. Terror attacks, conversely, could deter foreign investment and tourism. Compared to the Hajj in Saudi Arabia (which uses massive security and technology) or the Kumbh Mela in India, the Amarnath Yatra presents unique challenges due to rugged terrain and active insurgency. International cooperation in counter-terrorism intelligence sharing is relevant.
Short-Term Measures: Ensure adequate rest and rotation for CAPF personnel to prevent fatigue. Conduct regular joint drills between CAPF and J&K Police. Deploy drone surveillance and sniffer dogs at vulnerable points. Implement mobile jammers to prevent IED activation.
Medium-Term Reforms: Institutionalize background checks for all yatra service providers annually, using Aadhaar-linked verification. Introduce a centralized security app for pilgrims to report suspicious activity. Enhance intelligence sharing between central and state agencies. The Padmanabhaiah Committee on police reforms recommended modernization of state police forces and better coordination with CAPF.
Long-Term Vision: Develop a comprehensive counter-terrorism framework for J&K involving community engagement and youth de-radicalization programs. Invest in technology like facial recognition, AI-based threat detection, and secure communication networks. The Kargil Review Committee and Group of Ministers on National Security suggested strengthening border management and internal security mechanisms. A stable security environment will reduce the need for heavy deployments over time.