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The Supreme Court's nine-judge Constitution Bench is currently hearing Kantaru Rajeevaru v Indian Young Lawyers' Association—the review petition against the 2018 Sabarimala judgment. This hearing has inherited not merely a dispute concerning a temple in Kerala but a fundamental constitutional question about the Essential Religious Practices (ERP) test, a doctrine that has shaped Indian jurisprudence on religious freedom for seven decades. The Bench is called upon to decide the scope of Articles 25 and 26, the meaning of "morality" within them, the interplay between individual rights and denominational autonomy, and critically, whether the ERP doctrine in its current form serves the constitutional values it was designed to protect. Justice Chandrachud's observation in Sabarimala provides the analytical framework: "practices which are destructive of liberty and those which make some persons unequal before the divine must be tested against the anvil of constitutional morality." The article examines how the ERP test, originally conceived as a modest administrative tool in 1954, has grown into a mechanism requiring courts to function as amateur theologians—a role increasingly misaligned with constitutional architecture.
Origins: Shirur Mutt (1954) The ERP doctrine was born in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt, a 1954 case arising from a narrow administrative dispute about whether a statutory commissioner could supervise monastery finances. A seven-judge bench ruled that freedom of religion under Article 25 guaranteed both religious belief and practice. To distinguish the religious from the secular, the Court looked to the religion itself, holding that the views of adherents were crucial to determining what constituted "essential" aspects of religion. This established the foundational principle that religious communities possess autonomy in defining their essential practices. [GK: Article 25 guarantees freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion; Article 26 guarantees freedom to manage religious affairs]
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26 MarThe Doctrinal Shift: Venkataramana Devaru (1958) In Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, the Court moved from deference to active judicial examination. The case concerned exclusion of Dalits from a denominational temple. Justice Venkatarama Aiyar scrutinised scripture and tradition and established that while the community's view would be considered, it would not be considered definitive. The Court thus asserted its own authority to determine what constitutes the "essential" practice of religion, departing from Shirur's "complete autonomy" aspect. [GK: This case predated the 9th Schedule protections and represented an early assertion of constitutional review over religious practices]
Expansion to Non-Hindu Traditions: Hanif Qureshi (1959) In Mohd. Hanif Qureshi, the Court extended ERP scrutiny to Islamic practices, examining whether cow sacrifice at Bakr-Id was obligatory under Islamic texts. The Court concluded it was not an obligatory religious act and therefore not protected under Article 25 as an essential practice.
The Cautionary Note: Syed Hussain Ali (1962) Justice Gajendragadkar in Syed Hussain Ali introduced what scholars term a "note of caution"—practices rooted in "superstitious beliefs" and "extraneous accretions" would not receive constitutional protection. This pushed the ERP doctrine toward a framework where courts could distinguish between "pure" religious practices and those tainted by superstition or added over time. [GK: The "superstition" standard has been controversial as it imports external criteria into religious evaluation]
The Constitutional Morality Turning Point: Sabarimala (2018) In Indian Young Lawyers Association v State of Kerala (2018), a five-judge Bench upheld women's entry into the Sabarimala temple. Justice Chandrachud's concurring opinion identified that Article 25(1) is expressly subject "to the other provisions of this Part," meaning Articles 14, 15, and 21 govern religious freedom's scope. This textual architecture means equality and dignity guarantees are not subordinate to religious freedom. [GK: The 2018 judgment was delivered by a Constitution Bench with Justices Dipak Misra (CJ), Khanwilkar, Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra, and Goel]
Constitutional Text and Architecture • Article 25(1) freedom of religion is expressly made subject "to the other provisions of this Part"—unusual among Part III rights • This subjects religious freedom to the guarantees of Articles 14 (equality), 15 (non-discrimination), and 21 (life and dignity) • Article 25(2)(b) preserves state power for "social welfare and reform" and throwing open Hindu institutions "to all classes and sections of Hindus"
Landmark Cases in ERP Evolution • Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt (1954): Seven-judge bench; established that freedom of religion covers both belief and practice; views of adherents crucial to determining "essential" aspects • Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore (1958): Justice Venkatarama Aiyar; Court moved from complete deference to active examination of scriptural basis; community argument not definitive • Mohd. Hanif Qureshi (1959): Court examined Islamic texts to determine cow sacrifice at Bakr-Id was not obligatory • Syed Hussain Ali (1962): Justice Gajendragadkar; introduced "superstitious beliefs" and "extraneous accretions" exclusion • Indian Young Lawyers Association v State of Kerala (2018): Justice Chandrachud; constitutional morality as the test; Articles 14, 15, 21 constrain Article 25 • Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India (2018): Defined constitutional morality as mental attitude guided by Constitution's text and spirit; check against "tyranny of majority"
Current Proceeding • Kantaru Rajeevuzaru v Indian Young Lawyers' Association: Nine-judge Constitution Bench conducting Sabarimala review • Questions before Court: scope of Articles 25-26; meaning of "morality"; individual rights vs denominational autonomy
The Proposed Reformulation • Current test: "Is this practice essential to the religion?" (asks courts to act as theologians) • Proposed alternative: "Is this practice compatible with constitutional commitments to equality, dignity, and fraternity?" • Justice Chandrachud's framework: Test practices "destructive of liberty" or making "some persons unequal before the divine" against constitutional morality
Political & Constitutional Dimensions
Government/Proponent View: The ERP doctrine serves as a necessary check preventing Article 25 from becoming a "blank cheque." Without judicial capacity to examine essentiality, any practice—however harmful or discriminatory—could claim constitutional immunity by wrapping itself in religious garb. The Constitution framers themselves anticipated this possibility, as evidenced by Article 25(2)(b) preserving state power for social welfare and reform and throwing open Hindu institutions to all sections. The state has a legitimate interest in ensuring religious practices do not perpetuate injustice, particularly caste-based discrimination.
Critic/Opposition View: The ERP test requires courts to engage in theological determination—an exercise beyond judicial competence and constitutionally misaligned. Asking whether a practice is "essential" to a religion demands expertise courts do not possess. The doctrine has evolved beyond its modest administrative purpose in Shirur Mutt into a mechanism that imports external standards (superstition, extraneous accretions) into religious evaluation. This judicial overreach violates the federal principle that religious communities should manage their own affairs under Article 26.
Constitutional Text Analysis The text of Article 25(1) presents an unusual architecture—explicitly made subject to "the other provisions of this Part." This distinguishes religious freedom from other fundamental rights and creates a hierarchy where equality and dignity claims can constrain religious practices. The framers deliberately constructed this hierarchy, suggesting religious freedom was never meant to exist in isolation from constitutional commitments to equality.
Economic & Financial Impact While the article does not focus on direct fiscal implications, the ERP doctrine carries significant economic dimensions. Religious institutions governed by the ERP framework (temples, trusts, endowments) collectively manage substantial assets. The extent to which these institutions can claim autonomy from state regulation affects the fiscal relationship between religious establishments and government. Article 25(2)(a) permits state regulation of economic and financial activities of religious institutions. Judicial uncertainty about ERP boundaries creates compliance ambiguity for religious institutions managing endowments and properties worth billions of rupees. Additionally, litigation costs and institutional resources consumed by protracted constitutional proceedings represent indirect economic costs.
Social Dimensions Proponent View: The ERP doctrine, properly applied, enables social reform by preventing harmful practices (untouchability, gender-based exclusion) from hiding behind religious immunity. The "superstitious beliefs" exclusion in Syed Hussain Ali provides a mechanism to weed out practices that society has outgrown. Constitutional morality, as articulated in Navtej Johar, acts as a check against majoritarian religious tyranny, protecting minority communities and disempowered groups (women, Dalits) from practices that deny their equality and dignity.
Critic View: When courts determine what counts as "essential" versus "superstitious," they privilege certain interpretations over others within religious traditions. This creates social division by positioning the state (through courts) as an arbiter of religious orthodoxy. The Sabarimala dispute exemplified this—while the Court sought to protect women's equality, the ruling was perceived by many devotees as state interference in religious affairs, creating social fracture along religious and gender lines.
Governance & Administrative Aspects The ERP doctrine creates governance challenges for both religious institutions and the state. Religious bodies face uncertainty about which practices will receive constitutional protection, complicating internal governance decisions. For the state, the doctrine requires bureaucratic capacity to assess religious claims—a task ill-suited to administrative structures. The Shirur Mutt case arose from a dispute about administrative oversight of monastery finances, illustrating how ERP questions intersect with governance structures. The nine-judge bench's resolution will determine whether courts or religious communities have primary authority over defining essential practices, with significant implications for institutional governance design.
International Perspective Constitutional protection of religious freedom exists in various forms globally, with different approaches to balancing religious autonomy and individual rights. The United States employs the "neutral principles" approach, avoiding theological determinations by applying general legal principles to religious disputes. European Convention jurisprudence requires interference with religious freedom to serve a "pressing social need" and be "proportionate." The Indian approach—where courts actively examine religious texts and practices to determine essentiality—represents a distinctive model. Other common law jurisdictions have generally avoided such deep judicial engagement with religious doctrine. The Supreme Court's potential reformulation toward "constitutional compatibility" rather than "essentiality" would align Indian jurisprudence more closely with international standards that emphasize rights compatibility over theological assessment.
Short-term Measures (Immediate Implementation) • The nine-judge bench should issue comprehensive guidelines on the standard of review for religious practices, establishing clear criteria for when courts will engage with ERP questions versus deferring to religious communities. • The Court should clarify the "superstitious beliefs" standard introduced in Syed Hussain Ali, providing objective criteria to prevent arbitrary application that imports majoritarian cultural preferences into religious evaluation. • Establish procedural safeguards ensuring religious communities are heard before courts make essentiality determinations, respecting Article 26's guarantee of denominational autonomy.
Medium-term Reforms (Constitutional and Institutional) • Consider legislative codification of the reformed standard, following the pattern of the Representation Act or other social reform legislation contemplated by Article 25(2)(b), to provide clearer guidance than case-by-case adjudication. • Strengthen alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for religious disputes before they reach constitutional courts, reducing adversarial litigation that polarizes communities. • Develop specialized expertise within the judiciary—potentially through dedicated constitution benches or trained panels—to handle religious freedom questions with consistent methodology.
Long-term Vision The Court's pending decision offers an opportunity to establish that religious freedom in India exists within—not in isolation from—the constitutional commitments to equality, dignity, and fraternity. The proposed reformulation from "Is this essential?" to "Is this compatible with constitutional values?" represents a principled approach that respects religious pluralism while maintaining constitutional supremacy. This framework aligns with the framers' intent, evident in the text of Article 25 itself, that religious freedom is bounded by the broader constitutional project. As Justice Chandrachud articulated, practices destructive of liberty or creating inequality "before the divine" must yield to constitutional morality—not because the state prefers secular values, but because the Constitution itself establishes this hierarchy of values.